December
2002 Message
Unaddressed Resistance in Psychotherapy:
Foundation for Codependent Therapeutic Relationships
by Sandy Sela-Smith, Ph.D.
Overview
This literature review reveals two perspectives of resistance in
psychotherapy. The first concerns the patient’s internal process
of avoiding painful information and the second pertains to an attitude
in the patient/therapist relationship. When Freud (1900) focused
attention on the therapeutic relationship instead of the internal
process of resistance, I propose that he collapsed the two resistances
into one by equating the patient’s internal process to the
external process of resistance as expressed in the therapeutic relationship.
This has laid the foundation for the formation of codependent therapeutic
relationships that fail to address internal resistance.
A number of therapeutic methods have evolved from Freudian psychoanalysis
or had connections to it, each attempting to correct what theorists
saw as misconceptions of classical psychoanalytic theory. I contend,
however, that those who opposed Freud such as Adler and Jung, as
well as the new theorists such as the Neo-Freudians, the object
relations therapists, the self psychologists, and others have inadvertently
followed in Freud’s (1900, 1913, 1933) footsteps. Like he,
they developed theories that interpret what the patient experiences
and contain the potential for codependency. I offer a nontraditional
perspective that refocuses attention on the internal process and
redefines the responsibilities of participants related to problem
solving and dealing with resistance in psychotherapy.
Traditional Views of Resistance
Weaving in and out of the psychological literature over the last
century are two explanations of the word resistance as applied to
psychotherapy. The first identifies resistance as the internal process
of preventing painful information that has been pushed out of conscious
awareness from coming back into awareness (Brewer & Freud, 1895;
Freud, 1900, 1905, 1915a, b, c, 1923, 1933; Horney, 1939; Janet,
1907, 1925; Jones, 1911; Stark, 1994). Priests, mesmerists, and
hypnotists who were the practitioners of early dynamic psychiatry
traditions from which psychoanalysis evolved, presented evidence
of their patients’ resistance to knowledge of painful information
in the waking-state that was only available in altered states of
consciousness (Ellenberger, 1970, Hilgard, 1987). Though the intention
of this internal resistance is self-protection, the long-term result
is a mental disturbance that may present itself as hysterical illness,
mental distress, and / or abnormal behavior (Brewer & Freud,
1895; Janet, 1907, 1929).
A second explanation of resistance was written in the Psychological
Bulletin II, (1905) which identified resistance as being simply
“something hindering inquiry” (p. 256). Around this
same time, Freud (1895, 1900) made reference to the struggle between
analyst and patient that hindered psychoanalysis. I propose that
Freud (1900, 1913, 1923, 1933) subtly collapsed the two definitions
into one when he concluded that the internal resistance of painful
information is the cause of the patient’s resistance to the
therapist. In doing so, the patient’s heuristic investigation
of his or her internal process is abandoned while the therapist’s
interpretation of the patient behavior based on theory determines
what is occurring within the patient. I hold the opinion that for
nearly a century, the generally accepted meaning of the word “resistance,”
as applied to psychotherapy has come from this collapsed definition
originating in Freudian Psychoanalysis. Therapeutic practices that
appear to focus on the patient’s internal experience still
define that internal resistance based on the theoretic perspective,
leaving the therapist in charge of defining the problem and providing
the solution. I submit that this practice creates the elements necessary
for the development of a codependent therapeutic relationship.
Codependent Relationship Literature
Codependent literature came to the forefront in the1970s and 1980s
popular press in the form of self-help literature based on clinical
experience rather than from rigorous research (Messner, 1996, Subby,
1986; Subby & Friel, 1988). Professionals who treated chemical
dependency needed to find ways to work with the spouses and children-of-
alcoholics. These specialists found that family members exhibited
symptoms similar to alcoholics. The examination of this concern
became the foundation of the codependency literature (Beattie, 1986;
Betz, 1987; Black, 1981; Bradshaw, 1990, Miller, 1981, 1983; Whitefield,
1986).
The relationship styles exhibited by persons in codependency with
alcoholics were recognized in many other relationships between persons
facing addiction issues. Anecdotal reports rather than research
documentation indicated that there were common characteristics of
relationships in which addiction is a factor. According to Loughead,
Spurlock, and Ting, (1998) popular literature of the 1970s and 1980s
identified a number of these features. They suggest that codependents
bind their self-esteem to the ability to control other people and
they suffer from distorted understanding of will power. Codependents
invest inordinate amounts of energy in efforts to improve other
people in their search for a semblance of self-worth. They also
tend to assume responsibility for meeting others' needs. Codependent
persons feel anxiety and boundary distortions around intimacy and
separation and become enmeshed in relationships with personality
disordered, chemically dependent, other codependent and/or impulse
disordered individuals. Cermak (1991) pointed out that codependent
persons are likely to have “three or more of the following:
constriction of emotions, depression, hyper-vigilance, compulsions,
anxiety, substance abuse, excessive denial, recurrent physical or
sexual abuse, stress-related medical illness, and/or a primary relationship
with an active substance abuser for at least 2 years” (pp.
64-76).
Because these findings were not based on empirical research, these
DSM-like descriptives (Cermak, 1991; Irwin, 1995; Loughead, et al.,
1998) and the assumptions made by writers such as Beattie (1986);
Miller, (1981, 1983); Norwood (1986); and Whitfield (1987) were
rejected in academic literature as unfounded. However, by the 1990s,
empirical research began to support what earlier anecdotal reports
had purported (Clark & Stoffel, 1992; Donat, Walters, &
Hume (1991); Loughead, Spurlock & Ting, 1998; Springerk, Britt,
& Schlenker, 1998; Wells, Glickauf-Hughes & Jones, 1999).
In these studies, the features of codependency as identified by
the popular literature were positively correlated with shame-proneness,
low self-esteem, and parentification (parent/child relationship
identified as one in which the child feels responsible for the parent
and expresses a need to take care of parental needs at the cost
of their own needs.) High codependency scores were also significantly
correlated to high external locus of control, high anxious/ambivalent
attachment and avoidant attachment.
Codependent Relationships
Earlier popular literature indicated that codependent systems create
a unique way of forming relationships that correlates with research
of the 1990’s (Clark and Stoffel, 1992; Donat, Walters, &
Hume (1991); Loughead, Spurlock & Ting, 1998; Springerk Britt,
& Schlenker, 1998; Wells, Glickauf-Hughes & Jones, 1999).
The Karpman (1968) codependent “drama triangle” depicts
a relationship between two or more participants in codependency.
Each person takes one of three positions: the victim, the rescuer,
or the persecutor. Each position fulfills a role-relationship with
the other roles in problem-oriented interactions. The “rescuer”
role takes the responsibility of supplying the solution for the
one that is experiencing the problem. The one who suffers from the
effects of the problem takes the “victim” role. The
persecutor in abusive relationships may be dominant most of the
time, using ongoing passive-aggressive behaviors or outright aggression.
However, when the victim or rescuer becomes disturbed by the control
of the other, an inherent characteristic of codependency, either
may shift positions and become a persecutor.
Rescuer Victim
A B Figure 1: A= The Karpman drama triangle
B= The Quigley shadow triangle
Problem Solver Victim
Victim Persecutor
Quigley (1989) pointed out that the unseen side of the rescuer
is a shadow victim who believes he or she must rescue someone in
order to feel valued. He suggests that hidden in the persecutor
is also a shadow victim whose vulnerability is defended by aggressive
acts; in the victim is a shadow aspect of self that is capable of
solving the problem. All roles have a victim aspect that struggles
to use the relationship for relief.
According to Weinhold and Weinhold (1989) the role participants
take in the “drama triangle” may shift a multitude of
times during a single incident. Whenever one party becomes dissatisfied
with the dynamics of the codependent relationship, he or she shifts
from one position and takes on one of the other two roles in an
attempt to force the non-compliant party back into compliance. Relationship
is based on the tension between the roles rather than on connection
and cooperation to find solutions. Problems tend not to get solved
because the codependent relationship needs problems to exist. The
relationship is characterized by struggle that is exhibited in ongoing
attempts to control the other, as well as, resist the attempts of
the other to control.
Codependence in the Therapeutic Relationship
In psychotherapy, the therapeutic relationship exists because a
patient is experiencing a problem. When there is an assumption that
the therapeutic perspective together with the therapist’s
intervention holds the solution to the patient’s problem,
I contend that the establishment of a codependent relationship begins.
If control is an aspect of the relationship, resistance becomes
the new problem and, now, the therapist may suffer because he or
she cannot be a successful rescuer of the patient if the patient
resists. As the two shift positions, the patient can become the
rescuer of the therapist by becoming compliant and accepting the
therapeutic interpretation. Perhaps the patient may become the persecutor
of the therapist by refusing to cooperate. The focus has shifted
from the patient’s presenting problem (caused by whatever
is being internally resisted) to the therapist’s problem (the
need to overcome the patient’s iatrogenic resistance in the
relationship.) I contend that whenever the therapist is in the rescuer
position, there is hidden victim in the therapist’s shadow
that is being projected onto the patient. Both therapist and patient
struggle in an attempt to control the behavior of the other. Control
replaces authentic relationship and resistance to control becomes
the focus. This becomes a potential petri-dish situation for creating
the characteristics identified in codependency (Cermak, 1991, Loughead,
et al., 1998).
Understanding of codependent relationships appeared in psychotherapeutic
literature regarding neurosis before the popular version became
known in the 1970s and 1980’s, though in these early references
theorists assumed that it was the patient who was neurotic. Ellenberger
(1970) pointed out that:
Jung defines neurosis as a “sick system of social relationships,”
a definition that is well in accord with the concepts of Janet as
well as Adler. Because of this projection the neurotic unconsciously
manipulates the persons around him (spouse, parents, children, and
friends) and plays them against each other so that he is soon enmeshed
in a web of intrigues of which both he and the other are victims.
(p. 719)
I propose that any rescuing therapist is neurotic
and codependent. The rescuing role might be played out as one of
Jung’s (1934b, 1936, 1939) archetypes within the masculine,
feminine, or androgynous images. Examples of the masculine roles
that either male or female therapists might assume include the benevolent
ruler or dictatorial tyrant, the authoritarian father figure, wise
old man, coach, or guide. Examples of feminine roles that might
be taken include the good mother, the caretaker of the innocent,
the protector of the lost, the weak and the broken, or the wise
old woman.
The role counterpart of the rescuing therapist
in codependency is the victim patient who may be an obedient or
unruly subject, a cooperative or difficult student, or a willing
or resistive apprentice in relationship with the one in authority.
The patient in relationship with the rescuing mother figure is one
who may be helpless, broken, weak, or lost. The patient in relationship
with a guiding or coaching therapist may be seen as one who is in
training to break free (even from the therapeutic relationship)
to become whole.
I speculate that therapists who identify with the codependent role
of the masculine archetype do not work well with helpless, broken,
weak , or lost patients where resistance is hidden. Therapists who
identify with the feminine archetypal images may not work well with
the unruly, difficult or resistive patients with visible resistance.
This speculation is based on the consideration that therapists who
assume therapeutic roles are themselves playing out codependent
relationships reflective of their resistance to becoming aware of
what has been pushed away just as their patients do. A therapist
who feels inferior may seek to be superior in a therapeutic relationship;
perhaps, a therapist who avoids the painful information held in
his or her own unconscious may select a therapy method that focuses
on the present and future and dismisses the value of delving into
the past.
I submit that many of the current psychotherapies
can be shown to have the potential to foster codependent relationships
in which the roles taken on by both the therapist and the patient
play out prescribed ways of relating. The focus of codependent psychotherapeutic
relationships is on the external resistance as in the case of authoritative-resistive
relationships or external chaos of the patient’s life as in
nurturing- distressed relationships. Both create a distraction to
internal resistance.
Jung (1965) suggested that the complex, which is the totality of
the components that make up a disturbance experienced by a patient,
contains important clues that both hide and reveal the patient’s
secret (p. 117). If a theorist creates a psychotherapeutic process
that contains codependency, a codependent therapeutic complex might
both hide and reveal the therapeutic secret. A patient’s resistance
to the therapist interpretation may be, as many theorists suggest,
resistance to awareness to what has been hidden; however, it might
be a legitimate struggle against an inappropriate interpretation
projected onto the patient by a neurotic therapist.
The Codependent Authoritarian Paternalistic
Relationship: The Role of the Despot or Benevolent Director Over
the Compliant or Rebellious Subject
Paternalism, derived from paternal or fatherly, is a word that describes
a relationship in which the one in authority takes care and control
of the needs of those who are subject by providing for their needs
without giving the subjects responsibility (American Heritage Dictionary,
1983). The superiority of the therapist is acknowledged by texts
on professional ethics, by APA ethical standards, (APA, 1982), and
by many state laws (e.g. F.S.S. 490 and 491, 1999) that regulate
the relationship within, outside, and beyond the therapeutic setting.
These standards assume the vulnerability and dependency of the patient
years after the relationship has ended and in some cases in perpetuity.
I contend that Freud’s psychoanalysis and Adler’s individual
psychology are examples of authoritarian paternalism.
Freud and psychoanalysis: The therapist
as ruler over the subject with patient’s
resistance identified as interference with psychoanalysis.
A review of classical Freudian psychoanalytic literature
from 1895 to 1940, in my opinion, reveals that psychoanalysis has
codependent characteristics at its foundation. Psychoanalytic theory
identifies what causes patients’ problems and what has to
be done for those problems to be solved. Though Freud’s conception
regarding original cause of the patient’s problem shifted
from actual trauma, as he proposed in 1895, to unrequited wishes
and drives as presented in 1900, Freud’s explication of the
solution remained the same, an explication, I contend, that has
embedded in it, codependency.
Freud, (1985, 1900) like many of his counterparts
at the end of the 19th century, searched for causes and cures of
hysterical illness, whereby patients experienced blindness, amnesia,
paralysis, and other diseases without any known physical cause (Freud,
1895, 1900; Janet, 1907, 1929). Freud (1985) used a mechanistic-organistic
positivism that reduced psychological processes to physiological
laws and physiological processes to physical and chemical laws.
He developed a model, as reflected in a document called the Project
for a Scientific Psychology (Ellenberger, 1970), that he never published,
but it contained the foundation for what became his psychoanalytic
theory. In this document he explained a complicated system of neurological
functions of excitation and inhibition later to be identified as
resistance. When he worked with people in those beginning years,
Freud interpreted these patients behavior from this physiological
perspective.
In Studies in Hysteria, Breuer and Freud (1895)
proposed a theory that painful memories that have become dissociated
convert into bodily symptoms that are relieved when the memories
are brought into consciousness. The explanation for the loss of
awareness from Breuer’s (1895) perspective is that the painful
events in childhood cause the child to enter a hypnoid state, a
state called somnambulism by hypnotists a century earlier, where
memories held in that state are not available to ordinary consciousness.
Breuer believed that traumatic memories could be retrieved only
when that state is re-entered. Freud (1896) later rejected the hypnoid
state theory and proposed that memories exist on a chain from the
present to the past. He believed that the therapist must trace the
chain of events from current hysteria to some incident in puberty
when less traumatic sexual incidents occur but are connected to
the original painful memories unavailable to normal waking awareness.
In therapy, as the doctor probes into the patient’s past,
the safety of the psychotherapeutic relationship allows the patient
to reconnect with memories of the buried events; however, it is
also possible for the patient to resist the probes, fight the doctor,
and resist the memory. (Freud, 1913, 1933)
Early in his work, Freud (1895, 1896) concluded that childhood sexual
trauma causes repression, resistance, and hysterical illness. Two
years later he shifted to a view that unresolved sexual drives in
early stages of development rather than actual traumas cause disturbance,
pain, repression, and resistance. Instead of the patient resisting
the probing for an actual memory, Freud (1900, 1915c) determined
that the patient resists becoming aware of hidden sexual fantasies
toward the opposite sex parent, a feeling the patient may later
project on the therapist.
With the embrace of this new perspective, Freud
(1900) withdrew therapeutic attention from seeking deeply buried
childhood trauma and rejected using hypnosis as an access tool to
the patient’s unconscious. Instead, he began to focus on patient’s
dreams and free association. He interpreted the meaning based on
psychoanalytic theory rather than permitting the patient to discover
his or her own meaning. With this shift, Freud proposed that dreams,
uncensored slips of the tongue, and uncensored talk available in
free association during psychoanalysis, provide access to what is
repressed and resisted in the unconscious.
Freud (1933) concluded that: "the defense
mechanisms directed against former dangers recur in the treatment
as resistances against memory. It follows from this that the ego
treats recovery itself as a new danger" (p. 238). This defense
that is ongoing in every aspect of therapy is what the therapist
must continually point out to the patient as the therapist interprets
the meaning of the dreams, slips of the tongue, and talk (Freud,
1913, 1920, 1923, 1925).
Freud (1924) reviewing what he had proposed earlier
in his work, defined resistance as an ongoing part of every aspect
of analysis whereby the patient attempts to block therapy as he
“clings to his disease and fights the psychoanalyst against
his own recovery” (p. 254). That fight can show up as resistance
to the therapists probing, to interpretation, and to the analyst
(Freud, 1925) or as refusal to keep what occurs in therapy between
the analyst and patient (1913). He argued that patients who discuss
their analysis outside the confines of the therapeutic relationship
want to remain in control of the process instead of working it through
with the therapist. The patient may enter a power struggle with
the therapist by refusing to participate in free association and
by resisting the procedures of analysis to recall, to insight, and
to change (Eagle & Wolitzky, 1992). There may be attempts to
cover thoughts with filling in silence out of fear of the analyst’s
criticism, which is subtle resistance in the form of compliance.
Freud also indicated that patients may attempt to take control of
the therapy process by planning everything they say in sessions
(1913) or that they attempt to take control by falling in love with
the therapist (1912). These acts of resistance become the focus
of analysis (Freud, 1925).
Much like the conflict inherent in codependency, psychoanalytic
theory sees conflict as the major descriptor of many relationships
(Corsini & Wedding, 1995). The three parts of self (id, ego,
and superego) struggle with each other (1923), not unlike an internalized
victim, rescuer, and persecutor. The self and civilization are in
continuous strife (1930), and of course, the patient and the analyst
are in contention for control. In 1914, Freud wrote Wolf Man, not
published until 1918, in which he used an analogy of an enemy army
making its way across a stretch of country to describe the therapeutic
struggle (p. 403). Freud (1925) insists that resistance is a part
of every step in treatment; he states that “every single association,
every act of the person under treatment must reckon with the resistance
and represents a compromise between the forces that are striving
towards recovery and the opposing ones” (p.103). The psychoanalytic
relationship experiences tension and resistance just as exhibited
in codependent relationships.
The student who trains to be an analyst must
go through psychoanalysis as a patient not only to learn how to
identify and interpret resistance, but also, to learn how to use
psychoanalytic methodology to duplicate the analytical relationship
that Freud had with his patients. In the therapeutic relationship
the therapist is in the dominant position and the patient is submissive.
The patient is not only in a vulnerable position physically, but
is also required to be emotionally vulnerable to someone who is
not sharing that vulnerability. During the analysis, the patient
relaxes on a couch and tells whatever comes to mind no matter how
futile, absurd, embarrassing, or even offensive it may seem (Freud
1925). While saying anything that comes to mind, the patient feels
moments of inhibition and other inner difficulties that interrupt
the flow of the process. Freud (1925) termed this interruption resistance.
Wolitzki (1995) pointed out that as a patient freely associates,
the analyst offers interpretations of the fixations that are exhibited
in the talking. The patient will eventually begin resisting what
the therapist interprets as forcing awareness into mental content
that the patient has warded-off in an attempt to prevent behavior
and attitudinal changes.
Wolitzki (1995) points out that anxiety and/or
depression, which may arise from accessing the repressed knowledge
or conflicted wish, often results in humiliation, shame, guilt,
or fear. This can create a sense in the patient of feeling victimized
by the process, which in turn causes more resistance to therapeutic
interpretation. The patient’s resistance eventually is projected
onto the analyst in transference and this becomes the focus of the
therapy. From a codependent perspective this transference and resistance
can be interpreted as the “victim” becoming angry at
the control of the therapist and shifting to the “persecutor”
or unruly subject position. The patient then uses passive aggressive
behaviors to force the therapist, seen as despot, to stop what the
patient experiences as persecution from the therapist.
Freud (1937) identified the underlying sources
of clinical manifestations of resistance as including the constitutional
strength of the instinctual drives, rigid defenses, and powerful,
repetitive attempts of the patient to seek familiar forms of gratification.
(I interpret these to be the defenses of the patient who feels control
and moves into the persecutor role to relieve what is perceived
as persecution coming from the therapist.) Resistance, Freud (1937)
concluded, is a natural tendency to defend against painful memory
and to avoid becoming aware. He contended that the patient’s
free association coupled with the therapist’s interpretation
provides new information as a counter to resistance. With this new
information there is an expansion of awareness that calls for new
behaviors and creates the cure.
Freud (1918) acknowledged that the therapist’s
self-esteem is enhanced when favorable conclusions to therapy are
achieved. He proposed that therapists who succeed in difficult,
long-term treatments are the ones who renounce short-term therapeutic
ambition and are to be commended since lengthy work produces results
“attained by the therapist” (p. 402). I interpret these
statements as reflecting the belief that it is the therapist who
does the work and the patient who resists what the therapist is
doing. This fits the sentiments associated with the rescuer in codependent
relationships, attempting to rescue the uncooperative victim. The
paternalistic relationship exists, perhaps at the expense of accessing
hidden, painful information that first created the disturbance.
I submit that the psychotherapeutic method, as well as, the therapeutic
relationship may be an expression of the therapist’s unaddressed
resistance that is projected into both the method and the relationship.
Adler and individual psychology: The therapist
as authority figure and patient as the student with resistance as
an iatrogenic artifact.
In the last decade of the 1800s, Adler began treating private patients
who were suffering from neither organic neurological problems nor
difficulties that required hospital psychiatry as did Freud (Ellenberger,
1970). Adler’s patients were people experiencing failures,
frustrations, and unfulfilled fantasies. Instead of “Freudian-Couch-Psychoanalysis”
that holds embedded messages of dominance and submission, Adler
sat across from and faced his patients in chairs similar in height,
shape, and size. He conducted talk therapy regarding present concerns
rather than depth psychology dealing with a search for unconscious,
repressed information and resistance to such exploration (Ellenberger,
1970; Lake, 1987; Lande, 1976; Mosak, 1995). He did not encourage
transference or dependence of patients on the therapist. From external
appearances, the process seems to operate without dominance or submission,
a practice much different from psychoanalysis.
Both Freud (1900) and Adler (1926) determined
that neuroses are formed as a result of the interaction between
the individual and society; however, their perspectives were in
opposition. Freud (1915) focused on the individual and internal
dynamics. He stressed the unconscious conflict regarding opposing
psychosexual needs, repression of drives that are not socially acceptable,
and the resistance to reconnecting with traumatic memories from
the past associated with that repression. Adler (1929, 1935), on
the other hand, focused on society and on the social factors that
cause the individual to feel inferior and to strive for superiority.
His focus was on the present and how the patient attempts to overcome
a sense of inferiority in the external world.
While Freud (1900,1925) gave resistance a central
position in his theory and practice, Adler (1935) dismissed resistance
as an iatrogenic artifact of psychotherapy. Adler (1917) did not
accept the psychoanalytic concept of inner conflict between separated
aspects of self, repression, and resistance as the norms that must
be overcome to attain mental health. Instead he believed in the
unity of the individual that causes all parts to cooperate towards
a common goal, just as individuals cooperate toward the common goal
of society. When the individual is seen as internally undivided,
there can be no internal resistance of one part of self to awareness
held by another part. The only resistance that may occur would take
place if the patient attempts to fight for superiority in a relationship
with therapist. Therefore, the therapist eliminates resistance by
a refusal to participate in the struggle. By accepting Freud’s
“collapsed” interpretation of resistance and then dismissing
it as an artifact, I propose that Adler made the same decision as
Freud, which was to focus on the external relationship, the former
involving the patients’ interaction with the “world”
and the latter, the patient’s interaction with the therapist.
Both disconnected from the patients’ internal process of resistance.
In his comparison of the “whole” individual as counterpart
to the whole society and then acknowledging conflict within society
but not within the individual, I believe Adler may have exposed
his own resistance to addressing internal conflict.
While resistance was a central concern of psychoanalysis,
inferiority was a major concern of individual psychology. Adler
(1917) theorized that an individual who believes him or herself
to be inferior creates a goal of self-assertion to become superior
which follows that others must be made inferior. This sets the individual’s
goal above the whole; a condition that Adler (1917) contends is
naturally opposed to the greater social good and in opposition to
the concept of the absolute logic of society. According to Adler
(1917), conflict between this personal goal of superiority and societal
goal of advancement of the whole is the cause of neuroses. Neuroses
can show up as self-focus, as striving for superiority, or fearing
that someone will be better.
The neurotic creates a false image of superiority
and attempts to make it real by living what Adler identifies as
a fictitious life; a fantasy made to allow the patient to feel superior
in a social system that has causes him to feel inferior. This fantasy
is the person’s attempt to create substantiation, or proof
of his superiority while disproving inferiority, results in experienced
everything in opposites: high or low, win or lose, best or worst.
He easily loses the feeling of superiority within moments after
a high or a win, and returns to a fear of being inferior. Instead
of experiencing authentic life, the patient lives in fear avoiding
awareness of inferiority and avoiding success which contains the
seeds of inferiority, comparable to Freud’s concept of resistance
to repressed information.
The irony is that while the individual pushes to substantiate the
fiction of superiority, he also creates behaviors to prevent the
fiction from meeting reality. The push to attain a goal of superiority
results in ambition, arrogance, jealousy, and hatred, but the opposite
may also occur when the neurotic person becomes shy, anxious, weak,
or withdrawn, creating what Mosak (1995) identified as a “tyranny
of the victim”. Adler (1917) suggests that anyone seeking
to be superior will experience failure even in success. This sets
up self-sabotage to prevent the self from having to face what he
calls “substantiated fiction.” Sabotage may take the
form of releasing the goal just as it is about to be attained, becoming
sick while striving for success, having accidents at critical moments,
or perhaps, by experiencing a debilitating neurosis that can be
blamed for the failure instead of having to discover the falsity
of the goal.
In the practice of Adlerian individual psychology, the therapist
has the job of determining if the actual life goal and life style
of the patient is contrary to the social goal. If the patients’
life goal and life style are not socially acceptable, psychological
disorder will result, while the law of social interest leads to
fulfillment of what he considered the 3 main tasks of life: occupation,
love and family, and community. The therapist points out to the
patient how the fictitious life goal and life style are in opposition
to “the reality of life and the law of social interest”
(Ellenberger, 1970 p. 620).
I propose that Adler (1917, 1925) set up a codependent
system by determining what the patient is experiencing. The theory
creates a superior position for the therapist who interprets the
patient’s behavior and experience based on that theory, which
is the rescuer role in codependency. In spite of the outward appearances
of equality between therapist and patient, and the contention that
the patient’s choice is paramount, I propose individual psychology
is another expression of a relationship of masculine dominance.
While Freud seems, in my opinion, to fulfill the dictator role,
I submit that Adler fits the image of the superior masculine authority
figure role and the patient is the inferior student. Ellenberger’s
(1970) comment that “Adler equated resistance with a form
of masculine protest, which had to be immediately pointed out to
the patient as undesirable” (p.621). This indicates an assumption
of therapist domination over the patient. In order for the cure
to take place, the patient must submit to the theory and the therapist’s
interpretation of the patient’s experience without resistance.
In his theory, Adler (1917) attaches significance
to family dynamics related to birth order and the problem of inferiority.
He described the position of the second child in a large family
as being always under pressure and trying hard to compete with the
older sibling (Bottome, 1939). It would not be difficult to see
how a theorist, a second born son who felt inferior to his elder
brother his entire life (Ellenberger, 1970 p. 577), would propose
a theory that emphasized the problem of inferiority while elevating
the theorist to a superior position, even while attempting to appear
to create equality. His experience with feeling inferior may have
allowed him to understand inferiority (Adler, 1917). However, his
particular struggle might not be what all patients encounter. It
may be that Adler’s painful experience of being a second child
was repressed and pushed away only to have it projected into a theory
of inferiority and projected onto patient behavior as a struggle
for superiority. If the patient gets better, the therapist hopes
to substantiate his superiority, and free himself from the unaddressed
inferiority from his childhood. Embedded in the therapeutic process
is a hidden agenda, the substantiation of the therapist. The therapeutic
relationship, as well as the theory, both hide and reveal what is
resisted and are expressions of resisted experience in the therapist.
Whatever the patient had actually experienced, repressed, and is
resisting, represented in the problem that brought him or her to
therapy may remain unattended, especially if it is not related to
inferiority issues, when therapy is focused on fitting the patient
into the theory.
Though Freud and Adler were fundamentally different
in their therapeutic models, it was Adler’s individual psychology
that most influenced psychoanalytic theory as it evolved into object-relations
psychotherapy. These Neo Freudian theorists incorporated an “almost
imperceptible assimilation of individual psychological concepts”
into their theories, (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 637) including Adler’s
interpretation of resistance and the role of the therapist.
Codependent Nurturing Maternalism: The
Role of the Care Giving Protector
With the next generation of therapists, the rising feminine consciousness,
and the increase in the number of women becoming practitioners,
I propose that the role of therapist expanded beyond the predominantly
paternalistic authoritarianism as characterized by Freud and Adler
to what I call nurturing maternalism. These women include Ainsworth
(1962, 1967, 1972, 1973, 1982), A. Freud (1937, 1972), Gilligan
(1988, 1993, 1997), Horney (1937, 1939), Klein (1935, 1946), and
many others. (Though the English language has the word paternalism
that describes a masculine role of domination, there is no equivalent
word suggesting a relationship where the one who nurtures takes
care by controlling the one nurtured. In order to create equivocation
in the masculine and feminine roles in what I propose to be the
codependent rescuing therapeutic relationship, I have will use the
word maternalistic to identify this kind of care giving.) Maternalistic
psychotherapies include therapies such as ego psychology, object
relations psychology, self psychology, existentialism, and humanistic
psychology. I contend that though the characteristics of the role
changed, the potential for codependency did not. Instead of focusing
on the theory to instruct the patient to fit into a prescribed mold
of psychological health, the new therapies focus on the patient’s
feelings to encourage him or her to accept a healthy mold. In both
cases, health, as well as the problems that block health, are still
identified by the therapist. The therapeutic rescuer in the role
of the authoritarian father simply expanded to include the rescuer
in a feminine form as maternalistic care-giving mother, both claiming
to know what is best for the disturbed and dependent patient-child.
Ego Psychology: The wise old woman and
the child in need of direction with patient’s resistance identified
as defense of the ego.
Freud had both supporters and detractors as his theories unfolded.
Some, such as Adler and Jung parted ways to develop their own theories
while others remained committed to his theories and were identified
as classical psychoanalysts. Still others began to challenge a few
of the premises without completely rejecting Freud’s (1900)
basic theory, and finally some changed enough of the foundational
precepts of psychoanalysis and incorporated other perspectives that
they became new psychotherapies. Perhaps, it was evolution within
Freud’s own thought that led to what later became known as
neo-Freudian psychoanalysis, which included ego-psychology and object-relations
psychotherapy.
Gregory (1987) identified Freud’s youngest
daughter, Anna, as the leading proponent of ego-psychology that
concentrates on the ego instead of the id. She concluded that ego-weakness,
rather than wishes and drives of the id, was the result of unsuccessful
defense against instinct and inability to adapt to social realities.
Hilgard (1987) suggested that Freud’s (1900) theory gave a
pessimistic view of human nature by preoccupation with anxiety and
guilt, while the new theorists saw human nature in a more positive
light preoccupied with a need to defend against outside threat.
I suggest this indicates the shift from a paternalistic therapeutic
perspective to a maternalistic one. Hartmann’s Ego Psychology
and the Problem of Adaptation (1939) introduced the concept of a
“conflict-free ego” sphere, in which problems could
be solved in an open and adaptive manner without regard to unconscious
residues from infantile experiences (p. 373). It might be valuable
to ask what unconscious residues may be hidden.
Those identified as ego psychologists (Cooper, 1987, 1989, 1992;
A. Freud, 1937; Hartmann, Kris, & Loewenstein, 1946; Schafer,
1969; Sullivan, 1953) concluded that defense and coping mechanisms
due to conflicted wishes are responsible for behavior and mental
life disturbance rather than Freud’s (1915c) explanation of
drive repression. These conclusions were seen as alternative formulations
of theory rather than complementary structures. The analysis of
the content of the unconscious and resistance to making the content
conscious was replaced by analysis of defense mechanisms “as
to whether they were adequate to the patient’s age, and to
the external and internal conflicts he had to withstand” (Ellenberger,
1970, p. 860).
Neo-Freudian therapists point out the resistance
just as their predecessor did, but with the purpose of making the
patient aware of dysfunctional ego defenses instead of repressed
drives. Neo-Freudians see transference as just another form of resistance,
something to be pointed out, but neither focused upon nor searched
out to discover its origins. The emotional dimension and meaning
of resisted material to the patient’s psyche is downgraded.
In the evolved version of psychoanalysis, rational problem solving
takes the place of looking into conflicts and pain in the unconscious.
The inner process of resistance that was first acknowledged by Freud
(1895) and then by-passed with the collapse of the two definitions
into one, became even more removed in Neo-Freudian psychoanalysis.
Therapeutic resistance to the internal resistance of the patient,
and perhaps the therapist, appears to be a parallel process in this
new psychotherapy, somehow matching what may still be unaddressed
within the patient.
Object Relations: The therapist as rescuer and patient as the broken
child with resistance interpreted as the patient’s avoidance
of painful relationship.
Object-relations oriented analysts contributed
to major rethinking regarding psychoanalysis. Believing that Freud’s
theory was based on too narrow a population that could not account
for problems encountered by those patients with whom they worked,
relational psychologists determined that the historical and present
environment had to be considered in the cause of the disorder and
the treatment. Instead of searching deeply into the individual to
observe resistances, the focus turned to interaction between individuals
and resistance to that interaction (Abraham 1924; Ainsworth, 1962,
1967, 1972, 1973, 1982; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980, 1988; Erikson,
1963, 1982; Fairbairn 1952; Fromm, 1941; Greenberg & Mitchell,
1983; Horney, 1937, 1939; Klein, 1935, 1946; Winnicott, 1965).
From the object-relations perspective behavioral
and psychological patterns are created from the interaction of three
sources. The first is the complex of mental representation of objects;
the second is comprised by the relationship that one’s self
has to the world of inner objects, and the third is the condition
that requires repetitive reenactment of this inner world in the
context of the outer world. Object-relations therapists do not focus
on repressed drives and wishes of the patient, with the therapist
poised to point out the repressions and the resistances to becoming
aware. Instead these analysts acknowledge that resistance provides
insight into what constitutes the three sources of the behavioral
and psychological patterns. The therapist can discover characteristics
of early relationships that negatively impact present relationships
and work to correct what was poorly formed (Greenberg & Cheselka,
1995).
Abraham (1924) wrote a significant paper regarding
depression and obsession related to unpredictable changes of patients’
“objects.” Klein and Fairbairn were both influenced
by this presentation but in very different ways. Klein (1935, 1946)
emphasized the original relationship, with mother as the one who
feeds the infant, as foundational to child development. She contended
that the infant goes through two major shifts while in this original
relationship and that later relationships are dependent upon the
degree to which this first relationship was a success or failure.
She identified the first shift as having to do with the paranoid
schizoid position, as the infant becomes aware of its separation
and deals with a struggle between its wish for survival (as separate)
and its death wish (to be rejoined with mother). The defenses in
this struggle are psychical splitting, idealization, projection,
and introjection. The second shift takes place in what she referenced
as the depressive position when the child realizes that mother is
a separate whole person. This awareness drives the child to restore
connection for survival. Within this struggle are ambivalent feelings
regarding love. The infant yearns for connection but is also angry
for being dependent. These conflicts, left unresolved in infancy
affect future relationships. The therapist’s job is to assist
the patient in resolving the conflicts by joining the patient in
a two-person relationship in order to model what the patient missed
in the earlier one between mother and child. I propose that when
the therapist becomes the care-giving rescuer who interprets the
patient’s problem within a theory, he or she has created the
potential for a codependent relationship.
Fairbairn (1952) looked at the relationships
that are formed as a result of the original relationship and identified
them as closed or open. Current closed relationships, based on mother-infant
relations that did not successfully transit survival-dependency
conflicts, result in what he considers to be crippling division
in the self. The part of self that is driven to reconnect is highly
sexualized and the part that is driven to independence rejects sexuality.
This conflict is repressed, yet is recapitulated, and any attempt
to become aware of the division is resisted.
Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) and Ainsworth (1962,
1967, 1973, 1982) extended Fairbairn’s (1952) Neo-Freudian,
object-relations theory by adding attachment theory, which introduced
ethological concepts into psychoanalytic thought. Though not psychotherapeutic,
per se, attachment theory provides therapists with ways to investigate
relational behavior in the therapeutic relationship as a reflection
of the original attachment with mother to determine if that attachment
was secure based, insecure, or avoidant.
In this new relational psychotherapy, the patient
comes to discuss a particular, concrete problem in the present that
could expand to deeper or more general concerns. Instead of the
therapist being the interpreter of the patient’s unconscious
as in classical Freudian psychoanalysis, this new “relational-psychoanalysis”
appears to be patient- oriented. The patient presents the material
that will be the subject of the therapist-patient work, and the
therapist is a guide, in the direction the patient already has chosen
to go by pointing out resistances that inhibit the process. From
this perspective, the patient’s unconscious is seen as a safe
place for feelings and thoughts or “internalized objects”
that would be anxiety provoking, if not debilitating, were they
to be conscious (Greenberg & Cheselka, 1995). Resistance is
interpreted as simply a protective facet of the unconscious and
needs to be understood from a relational viewpoint. The therapeutic
relationship, acting as a healthy model, can facilitate the transcending
of unhealthy childhood relationships (Buckley, 1996; Fairbairn,
1952).
According to Fairbairn (1952), “the psychotherapist
is the true successor to the exorcist. His business is not to pronounce
the forgiveness of sins, but to cast out devils” (p.59), those
devils being bad object relations. Fairbairn (1952) continued:
There is no doubt in my mind that the greatest source of resistance
is the fear of the release of bad objects from the unconscious for,
when such bad objects are released, the world around the patient
becomes peopled with devils which are too terrifying for him to
face. (p. 59)
The good object that takes the place of the bad object is the therapist.
There is an assumption that this healthy relationship with the therapist
stimulates the growth and strengthening of the arrested ego, thus
allowing for the disclosure of inhibiting information that would
have been destructive in the less developed ego-self.
Greenberg and Cheselka (1995) suggest that these “relational”
psychoanalysts have a belief that conflict permeates all mental
processes. “When the thought of exploring a particular issue
becomes anxiety producing, aspects of the personality that are security
seeking will come into play, and the person may avoid dealing with
the very issue for which he/she came into treatment. (p. 66) It
becomes the therapist’s job to notice the opposing forces
and guide the patient back to the patient’s stated goal. The
therapist’s responsibility is to help the patient fight against
the resistance to discussing a subject by redirecting the conversation,
by asking if the patient is trying to avoid something, perhaps some
“bad object” or by drawing attention to something that
is missing in the conversation. From this perspective, resistance
is respected but also seen as something necessary to point out and
remove.
Stark (1994) comes from a similar object relations perspective as
Buckley (1996); Fairbairn (1952); Kohut (1959, 1968 a, 1968 b, 1971
1977, 1979, 1981,1984); Rowe (1982, 1993, 1994, a & b, 1996;
Rowe & MacIsaac, 1989). She stated that patients are people
who protect themselves from the pain of truly knowing their past
and present objects. In order to avoid grief, they hold on to misconceptions.
Stark (1994) noted that the patient must learn to accept the objects
as they are and give up the illusions held of the objects to which
they have maintained infantile attachment. She suggested that surviving
the pain inherent in the illusion permits the patient to release
infantile hope and embrace mature hope. The patient’s work
in therapy, according to Stark (1994), is to work with 27 therapeutic
tasks, such as arriving on time, talking about childhood events
(reminiscent of Freud’s requirement that patients not hold
back anything that comes to mind in free association), and getting
angry without getting abusive. If patients resist working with the
“tasks” the therapist must “articulate the intrapsychic
conflict behind the patient’s distress in plain language”
(Winer, 1995). Stark’s (1994) method, as in psychoanalytically
based therapies, interprets the therapeutic relationship with what
is seen as inherent transference characteristics. The relationship
becomes the center of therapy, a substitute arena where qualities
of the old relationships are worked through by confronting the resistance
to the therapeutic relationship.
Horney (1937), who had been an instructor in psychoanalysis, was
influenced by the work of anthropologists Ruth Benedict and Margaret
Mead and adapted their findings to psychoanalysis. She rejected
the tenets of penis envy and libido theory, which resulted in her
dismissal from the New York Psychoanalytic Society. Horney (1937)
expressed shock by the emphasis placed on success in America, a
concept that she believed inevitably would cause a majority of people
to feel they had “failed” in life. She saw human relationships
that are contaminated by rivalry, as unable to possess genuine warmth
and security. Horney (1937) saw this condition as disastrous for
the development of a healthy, free personality since the need for
security in a hostile world would become the basic dynamic in the
formation of character.
Horney (1937) and Adler (1917) had similar interpretations regarding
the drive to superiority but differed regarding the etiology of
the drive. Adler attributed it to the external social conditions,
and Horney interpreted it as coming from the mind attempting to
create an artificial, but acceptable self, as if they are mutually
exclusive rather than necessarily complementary. Resistance comes
into play, according to this neo-Freudian’s perspective, as
a means to not feel the pain when the pride system, or idealized
self-image begins to be stripped away in psychoanalytic psychotherapy.
The stripping occurs to replace the pride system with realization
of the true self. Her contribution to psychoanalysis was the proposition
that “tensions generated by a culture could be the cause of
neurosis” (Lande, 1976).
In ego-psychology and object-relations therapy, I conclude that
the maternalistic mother has overshadowed the paternalistic father
in the role of therapist. Though it appears that attention is centered
on the patient instead of the theory, the therapist still interprets
what is occurring within the patient and the therapist’s responsibility
is to become the person upon whom the patient is dependent to heal.
As long as the therapist continues to define the interiority of
the patient, what is really occurring within remains hidden as the
relationship and the interpretation overshadow the internal process.
Self Psychology: The therapist as defender of the patient
who is weak with resistance used by the patient to create safety.
A more recent change in psychoanalysis came with Kohut (1984) who
proposed self psychology, a perspective that interprets the individual’s
primary aim as the creation of a cohesive and fulfilled self. To
him, the fulfillment of drives, the defense against conflicting
wishes, or longing to absorb the objects to which one is attracted
are objectives that are contradictory to individual needs. Objects
with which someone is in relationship, or selfobjects as Kohut dubbed
them, are important for their function in forming and fulfilling
self, and not important for their intrinsic essence. Self psychology,
as formed by Kohut (1959, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1984), and implemented
most notably by Rowe (1982, 1989, 1993, 1994, 1996), moved from
a theory-and-analyst based therapy to what was believed to be a
more patient-centered approach. Self psychologists believe the patient’s
experience, rather than psychoanalytic drive therory, has become
the focus of psychotherapy. However, one might notice that theory
continues to identify what the patient experiences. The patient
who is now in front and center is one who relates to the world and
everything in it from a personal utilitarian perspective, unable
to experience a “thou” in “I and thou.”
In self psychology theory, the process of mirroring, whereby the
caregiver reflects back to the infant what the infant is projecting
outward, is seen as a fundamental need in the formation and development
of the self. If mirroring is not satisfactorily achieved in the
development process, the individual will have an enfeebled sense
of self, and development will be arrested, since what is not reflected
back is not identified or developed. Resistance to accessing the
self is then formed to protect that frailty. Therefore, the therapist
does not seek to overcome resistance because resistance is interpreted
as necessary in preserving an undeveloped part of the individual.
Instead, the therapist provides the function of mirroring to allow
the arrested development to be re-stimulated toward completion.
(Kohut, 1984, p. 615) “Self psychology’s focus on selfobject
as the experience of a function provided is clearly different from
that of object relations theory where the focus is on the object
per se and not on the functions provided by the object” (Rowe,
1996, p.68). Strean (1996) a leading self psychologist explained
that patients are able to move forward in the treatment when their
need to maintain their developmental position is respected and resist
forward movement when they feel misunderstood. This contrasts with
to the classical Freudian view of resistance as “treatment
interferences that must be overcome as they defend against awareness
of impulses and allow for unconscious instinctual gratification.
(Strean, 1996, p. 29)
Transference is still central to Kohut’s self psychology,
but the focus is on the patient’s needs related to the developmental
stage the patient is experiencing as he or she moves toward mature
forms of selfobject transference. Rowe (1996) points out that patients
who were seriously disillusioned as children will resist emerging
needs to idealize for fear of further disillusionment. “Patients
who have suffered humiliation will resist sharing unique thoughts
and ideas that could be the target of critics” (p. 86).
Resistances to the development of the selfobject transferences in
psychotherapy are, therefore, attempts to protect against being
re-traumatized.
Rowe indicated that severely traumatized patients, who have serious
defects in the structure of the self, return to these protective
patterns of experiencing others during the “working through”
process, as well as in times of development of new forms of selfobject
transferences. He suggested that this is not a compulsion to repeat,
which is the repeating of patterns of behavior that provide instinctual
pleasure or unpleasure, as an effort to master and bind excitation.
Returning to old patterns is simply going back to the known instead
of risking unknown dangers in some new pattern. When the patient-in-resistance
feels as if he or she is understood, a mirroring has taken place
and the self is strengthened, causing the need for the resistance
to disappear. The patient then continues to move up the developmental
line toward maturity. The therapist remains in control and identifies
the patient’s problems. The potential for codependency remains.
Existentialism: The therapist as companion of the lost
patient with resistance as a defense of self-and-world construct.
The person-centered perspective of existential-humanistic psychotherapy
grew spontaneously first in Europe in the 1940’s and in America
in the 1950’s from psychiatrists and psychologists who believed
that earlier theories did not deal with the actual, immediate person
to whom things were happening. These therapists were aware that
we are living in an age of transition that is experienced by almost
every human being as a time of alienation from fellow humans, of
threat by nuclear war and economic upsets, and of confusion from
the radical changes. They note that we are all beset by anxiety.
With the need to deal with this anxiety at its base, existential
psychotherapy does not offer answers as much as it “asks deep
questions about the nature of the human being and the nature of
anxiety, despair, grief, loneliness, isolation, and anomie. It also
deals centrally with the questions of creativity and love”
(May & Yalom, 1995, p. 262-263).
Existential-humanistic interpretation of the psychodynamics of
the human condition sees conflict as central to human experience.
This conflict is not like that of the Freudian perspective that
sees the individual as an instinctively driven being at war within
the self and with the world. It is also not like the Neo-Freudian
model that believes the conflict is relational with a struggle between
growth toward autonomy and the need for security. The existential-humanist
sees the conflict in terms of struggle between the individual and
the “givens” of existence that ultimately concern each
person. These are “death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness”
(May & Yalom, 1995). The individual constructs defenses against
awareness of these four fears and these constructs become the ground
for experience. The resistance to awareness forms not only the world
the individual constructs to block that awareness, but also creates
the very discontent experienced within that world. This construction
is intended to resist experiencing the pain of knowing that death
is inevitable, that the self is responsible for what he or she makes
of life, that each of us is ultimately alone, and that one must
find his or her own meaning in a meaningless universe.
The existential-humanistic perspective recognizes that each person
has a self-and-world construct that is, in fact, the life as experienced
by that person. (Bugental, 1976, 1986, 1990, 1992; Bugental &
Sterling, 1995) When an individual is experiencing life as not satisfactory,
it is necessary to change the way of being and the view of the world
that is held. The problem is that the subject matter that is being
investigated in order to make the changes is the very ground from
which the examination takes place. To dismantle the ground is tantamount
to the destruction of the self-and-world construct, which is experienced
as destruction of the self and life. But to not change the self-and–world
construct is to continue to live unsatisfactorily, which too, may
seem like self-destruction. Bugental and Sterling (1995) have pointed
out that “a person’s self-and-world construct system
is that person’s life—or at least the plan or pattern
for that person’s life” (p. 234). If that system has
been able to evolve in such a way that it provides reasonably dependable
outcomes and prevents excessive stresses, it will be strongly defended
and will resist any attempt to change it. What may be less obvious
is that even if the system does not work so well, the person is
still likely to defend it. This is what creates the task of existential-humanistic
depth psychotherapy that seeks to assist the patient in making lasting
life changes. When the experience of life is too overwhelming, he
or she may be willing to consider changing the construct, but the
closer to the change, the more overwhelming the fear of the loss
of the current construct and self destruction.
This perspective suggests that resistance and defense are two aspects
of the same process: the preservation of the self-and-world construct
system that the patient feels is necessary to his or her life and
yet is destroying life. There is a struggle between the maintenance
of the system and dismantling it, which places the patient in a
catch-22 situation. It is a gamble of current benefit/costs against
hypothetically greater future benefits without any assurance that
giving up the former will produce the latter.
If the therapist is to be useful, he or she must be an ally who
can remain with the person as a supportive companion while the patient
finds his or her own way out of the seemingly impossible trap. However,
if the therapist conceives resistance as being in opposition to
therapeutic intervention instead of an understandable defense of
the only way the patient knows how to live in the world, the therapist
becomes an adversary instead of an ally. The patient may now have
to resist the therapist’s pressure to change the self-and-world
construct as well as their own inner conflict about the change.
Instead of facilitating change, the therapist interferes with the
transformation process that is being called into existence by the
challenge. When the therapist is seen as an adversary the patient
may resist the direction toward which he or she believes that the
therapist is trying to push (Bugental, 1976; Bugental & Sterling,
1995; Gilligan, Rogers, & Tolman, 1997).
Bugental (1976) differs from therapists who interpret resistance
to be the patient’s defense against the interpretations of
behavior made by therapists. Instead he defines resistance as:
…the impulse to protect one’s familiar identity and
known world against perceived threat. In depth psychotherapy, resistance
is those ways in which the patient avoids being truly subjectively
present—accessible and expressive—in the therapeutic
work. The conscious or unconscious threat is that immersion will
bring challenges to the patient’s being in her world. (p.
175)
Bugental (1976) suggests that resistance, outside of therapy, as
well as in therapy, results in inauthentic being. The person has
removed him or her self from subjective experience and avoids presence
in life by objectifying the self. May (1991) in The Cry for Myth,
uses the Oedipus myth (Freud, 1924) itself to point out that it
is not just fantasy that is significant in human nature (and, therefore,
in any therapy process that deals with human nature). The resistance
to knowing the truth of the fantasy for which one wishes is also
central to our natures and to therapy (p.73).
Bugental and Sterling (1995) identify what he calls two capacities
of human beings. One capacity holds the “learning” that
has been incorporated into a person’s personal knowledge.
This is what we call on when we encounter something that is familiar.
These authors contend that “searching,” the second process,
is complementary to learning and is called on:
When we do not have a satisfactory pre-established path for dealing
with a situation of importance to us. Searching involves risking
openness to the unknown, exploring possibilities, experimenting
with some that seem likely, using alternative paths when blocked,
and eventually resolving the situation. (p. 235)
This searching capacity has been given greater attention in psychotherapy
and has been named “free association” in psychoanalysis,
“unfolding” by Buber (1970) and “focusing”
by Gendlin (1978), all similar ways of tapping into the same human
power.
By assisting the patient in his or her internal investigation through
seeking, an understanding and reorganization of information can
occur. The expanding, deepening, and transforming of self-and-world
structures can take place. In order for this transformation to occur,
the therapist reflects back to the patient old defensive patterns
that have been part of the old self-and-world structures that protect,
but also stand in the way of changes the patient wants to make.
The resistance must be “worked through” at the time
it occurs by continually pointing it out and asking the patient
to become conscious of the patterns and their ill consequences.
It is highly desirable for the therapeutic relationship to become
strong enough to support the patient as he or she begins to call
into question self-definition and world-view. This level of work
is with character structures and arises “from experience that
actually began at the preverbal level and then…(became)…extended
and modified by the patient’s life and inner promptings”
(Bugental & Sterling, 1995). Once this level is reached in the
patient, the relationship with the therapist (as in Fairbairn, 1952;
Klein, 1935, 1946; Kohut, 1959, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1984) becomes
a part of the self-and-world construct, then major self-and-world
structures can be reconstructed.
Bugental and Sterling (1995) identify three distinguishing aspects
of existential-humanistic psychotherapy. The first is that the therapist
does not attempt to account for the patient’s symptoms in
terms of the patient’s history. “Purpose, rather than
cause, is the decisive dynamic” (Raskin & Rogers, 1995).
Causal thinking, they suggest, objectifies the patient and loses
genuine presence needed for productive searching. According to Bugental
and Sterling (1995) instead of looking into the patient’s
history, the therapist must focus on how the patient is in the world
and how the patient is attempting to make his or her life more pleasant
in the present. The second characteristic, like most of the other
methods, is that the therapist’s job is to assist the patient
in fostering inner awareness, by identifying the resistances. Finally,
the therapist, as Adler insisted, is an educator, facilitating the
enlargement and change of the patient’s way of being in the
world. This is not a medical, curative, or healing process, it is
educational. (p. 249). One might question the need to make these
therapeutic outcomes oppositional or exclusive.
As person-centered as this approach appears to be, the therapist
remains the one who maintains focus on the present and uses the
past only to identify character structures. The therapist identifies
the resistance and has determined the patient’s interior experience
based on a theory. The therapist’s objective remains in that
the focus is on how the patient is in the world and how the patient
is attempting to make his or her life more pleasant in the present,
instead of encouraging the patient to go inward to discover resistance,
repression, experience, and meaning.
Other Therapeutic Relationships
Otto Rank (1929) proposed that birth created suffering, and was
the greatest trauma of all. He suggested that there is an unconscious
longing to return to the womb, similar to Klein’s (1935, 1946)
paranoid schizoid shift. He proposed that all of a person’s
life experience is formed by the birth experience. Transference
is interpreted as reenactment of the infant’s mother fixation.
Healing occurs after abreaction to the birth trauma, and successful
separation from the analyst has occurred. In this relationship,
the therapist is the coach and resistance is evidence of a patient's
will to independence, and therefore a positive factor. Rank focused
on the immediate analytic situation rather than on the past. He
emphasized ‘experiencing’ rather than learning, and
becoming aware of the patterns of reaction rather than analyzing
individual experiences. The will to self-determination and the creative
aspects of the patients behavior received attention. Rank (1929)
determined that instead of wearing down resistance, as a Freudian
analyst would likely attempt, resistance should be used to direct
self-discovery and development. While there may be truth here for
some patients, someone who experienced abandonment and resists reconnecting
with the debilitating pain of separation by non-attachment may not
identify with a therapist who can only see a need for independence.
Wilhelm Reich (1933), a psychoanalyst, shifted the Freudian focus
on sexual energy, from the drive perspective, to a biological-energetic
perspective. He proposed that social inhibitions against sexual
expression and resistance to those inhibitions created not only
psychological disturbance but also muscular tension and eventually,
physical illness. While Freud and Adler applauded the constraints
of society, Reich, like Horney, believed that society is the cause
of the tension and illness. Reich contended that dissolving of the
psychic resistance is parallel to that of the “muscle armour”
that relaxes in the release of sexual tension. The idea that the
body could hold psychological tension became a component in the
explosion of body therapies in the decades that followed (Bing et
al, 1999). Like Freud who limited the libido to sexuality without
including will and striving, Reich limits his theory to sexual tension
when it is possible that others may suffer from tensions caused
by other issues. A narrow understanding of body tension may distract
the patient from searching for unconscious psychophysiological response
to the other forms of trauma that remain hidden and resisted.
Perhaps the two theories that came closest to being interior-oriented
were Rogerian Psychotherapy and Jungian Analytical Psychology. Yet
they, too, created forms that contain the potential for missing
the information the client resists. Roger’s (1951, 1961) perspective
appears to be person-centered. He presented a method whereby resistance
is circumvented by not engaging it. The job of the therapist as
in self psychology is simply to mirror back to the patient what
the patient presents. However, to focus fully on the patient as
if the therapist and the relationship do not exist other than as
a mirror of the patient, is to assume that the “mirror”
reflects only the patient, rather than the therapist’s image
of the patient. I propose that to resist resistance by entering
the therapeutic relationship in a way that does not engage resistance
may lead to a possible dismissal, denial, diminishing, or dissociating
of what is deeply buried and resisted. A therapy that has created
a method that makes the therapist invisible, perhaps is a metaphor
for a theorist, as well as a therapist, who cannot see him or her
self.
Jung (1934, 1936,1939) was a seasoned veteran of the inner-journey,
having spent six years on his own quest that led beyond the personal
unconscious into the collective unconscious. He believed that the
journey inward opened to “the reservoir of thoughts and images
of all mankind, a sort of agglomeration of the archetypes…(that
are)…preexisting forms that seem to be the inherited structure
of the psyche” (Lande, 1976, p. 39). Corsini and Wedding (1995),
editors of Current Psychotherapies, described Jungian psychology
as especially inclusive in that it embraces concepts from Janet,
Freud, and Adler. However, Jung added wholeness, completion, and
individuation. The editors point out that this perspective allows
for the “depths of the collective unconscious and width of
humanity’s collective history, art, and culture while grounding
itself solidly in the particular individual at a particular time
and moment” (p. 125). What is significant about Jung’s
experience toward individuation and wholeness is that he took the
journey by himself. After having had his own experience, he outlined
the journey for others, recommended that all analysts go through
analysis and advised anyone seeking individuation to then take their
inner quest in analysis only with a seasoned veteran. Regarding
that journey, Jung pointed out: “the dread and resistance
which every natural human being experiences when it comes to delving
too deeply into himself, is, at bottom, the fear of the journey
into Hades” (1953, V. 12. p. 336).
In detailing the domain of the personal and collective unconscious,
and identifying all the internal and archetypal players, Jung created
a path for others to follow. However, by detailing that path, it
is possible that the apprentice may not be able to discover his
own individuation because a master-in-the-making must create his
own path by surrendering to the journey, not to his master’s
path. I propose that Jung created a system that has the potential
to produce technicians rather than masters, and they may find what
Jung found rather than discover their own resistances, their own
Hades.
Ellenberger (1970) made a summation of the inner journeys of Freud
and Jung by noting that:
Those who undertake a Freudian analysis will soon develop intensive
transference neurosis, have Freudian dreams, and discover their
Oedipus complex, child sexuality, and castration anxiety. Those
who undertake a Jungian analysis will have Jungian dreams, confront
their shadow, their anima, their archetypes and pursue individuation.
(p. 737)
I propose that the same observation can be applied to of any of
the therapies reviewed in this study. Those patients who identify
with the world-view of their therapists or those who have a need
to be compliant in a codependent relationship may organize their
therapeutic experience around the therapy presented. Those patients
who follow the therapist out of codependency will likely find what
the therapist expects them to find. Those who do not identify with
the therapeutic world-view or have a codependent need to challenge
the control of the therapist will be resistant and may, together
with the therapist, focus on the external relationship instead of
search for what information is being resisted. It would be possible
for the compliant or resistive patient to miss what is hidden within
the self as the patient focuses on working with or against the therapist.
If the relationship is the focus of therapy, the very resistance
experienced within the interiority of the patient is duplicated
in the relationship. If the therapist is also using his or her therapeutic
perspective as a means to resist his or her internally repressed
information, not only is a codependent relationship established
with the patient, but an unconscious complicity may be established.
Therapy may parallel the resistance of the patient as well as the
therapist and the theory.
The Pattern
After reviewing psychoanalysis and the major theories that have
been influenced by or evolved from psychoanalysis, I have noticed
a pattern that I propose creates the codependent therapeutic relationship.
Psychotherapists with pre-conceptions regarding what causes neuroses
are confronted with patients who have psychological disturbance.
The patients reveal their neuroses and what the therapists interprets,
the patients may resist. The job of therapists is to continue to
interpret the problems and confront the resistance until the patients
accept the interpretation and release the neuroses. What may not
be as obvious in this pattern, I believe, is that theorists bring
their personal experiences as well as their resistances into the
observations, the formation of the theories, and the interpretation
of patients. (Freud’s struggle with his father can be seen
in the Oedipal theory and Adler’s competition with his older
brother seems to have made its way into the theory of inferiority.)
Another part of the pattern that may not be noticed is that, too
often, the theory rather than the person is what is seen. Theories
based on the observation of patients as in the case of person-centered
therapies, those founded on some application of natural science
as in psychoanalysis, or the ones growing out of medical discovery
as in individual psychology, get in the way of the persons who sit
in front of therapists. Without the patient experiencing his or
her interiority, the internal process of resistance remains unaddressed.
Jung (1954) proposed that the outside world can only be known through
a person’s internal images of the outside world. The images
and the organization of them into meaning are largely unconscious.
Therefore, what each of us perceives is largely determined by who
we are. What each theorist concluded about others is likely more
a reflection of his or her interiority than about anyone who might
be sitting in the patient’s chair or lying on the couch. The
assumption that the theory is correct, focuses attention on the
assumption rather than on the patient’s internal experience
and the patient is not seen.
Conclusions and a Non-Traditional Interpretation of Resistance
I propose that Freud’s shift in focus from the internal experience
of the patient, to the external therapeutic relationship and to
the theory regarding interiority and resistance, became the prototype
for major psychotherapeutic theories, in spite of the fact that
some are considered to be patient-centered. Historically, the theoretic
stance, rather than the patient experiencing his or her interiority,
is what identifies and interprets the internal experience of the
patient. That stance also defines internal resistance in terms of
patient resistance to therapy.
From this review I conclude that underneath resistance there is
pain (e.g., Breuer & Freud, 1995; Buckley, 1996; Freud, 1933;
Horney, 1939; Jung, 1953; Stark, 1994) related to unresolved, unexpressed
and, therefore, unintegrated experience. This review supports the
conclusion that underneath the pain there is fear (Freud , Adler,
Jung, Fairbairn, Rowe, Bugental). Dissociation from pain and fear
related information regarding painful experiences creates internal
disturbance, which in turn creates neuroses. Current psychotherapies
have evolved from early attempts to address these debilitating neuroses.
However external observation rather than internal exploration of
the pain and fear has produced therapeutic methods that have inherent
limitations at best and are complicit in the unconscious conspiracy
to resist awareness of interiority at worst.
I submit that neuroses are healed when the patient garners the
courage to feel the pain, and surrender to the fear of what the
pain means. Without a therapist or a theory deciding ahead of time
what is painful or feared, the patient is able to discover what
has been repressed and resisted. This can only be done by rejecting
Freud’s (1900) collapsed definition of resistance and giving
credence to the patients’ experience of his or her own interiority.
In so doing, the patient has the responsibility to discover the
cause of the problem and the therapist becomes a facilitator for
the patient’s self-search. The unaddressed resistance may
be related to sexual abuse or sexual fantasy; resistance may be
covering the fear of inferiority or the lack of a loving relationship
with mother. It may be an existential struggle regarding death,
or related to the shock of being born. It may be the pain of having
choice removed or the fear of making a wrong choice when given freedom
to choose or any of the experiences we have in being human. But
this is for the patient to discover, not for the therapist to determine
based on a theory. There is no need control the self-search, and
no need to prove or disprove any particular theory.
The more that the therapist has done his or her own self-searching
to overcome pain and face fear, the more effectively the therapist
can be a facilitator for the patient’s investigation rather
than a role player in a codependent relationship. The patient can
know that another human being has plunged into Hades, and made it
out to the other side. Both Freud and Jung recommended that analysts
go through analysis to know how to direct the patient on the journey.
I propose that the value of the therapist taking the journey inward
is that theory, therapy, and the patient do not receive projections
of the therapist’s resistance, which frees therapist and patient
to focus on the disturbance that caused the patient to begin the
therapeutic process. I contend that the truly effective therapist
is one who has taken his or her own inner journey and has discovered
and overcome resistances that hide the pain. After experiencing
a successful journey, the therapist no longer needs to use relationships,
including therapeutic relationships to enhance self-esteem, to feel
empowered in life, and to be assured of self-worth and worthiness.
The therapist can authentically enter a therapeutic relationship
that acknowledges the esteem, the power, and the worthiness of the
patient to discover his or her own interiority and take responsibility
for self-healing.
Personal Reflections
I became interested in resistance in psychotherapy as a result of
my own struggle with internal resistance in a particular area of
my life. I wanted to review what theorists had discovered about
the interior process that would allow me to better access my own
resistance. However, as I reviewed each of the therapeutic positions
included in this study, I found a myriad of observational explanations
regarding the cause of resistance and how it plays out in the therapeutic
setting, but found little about the internal confrontation of one’s
own resistance from the experiential perspective. It would be a
useful contribution to the literature to conduct heuristic self-search
inquiry (Moustakas, 1990, Sela-Smith, 2001) from a researcher-as-participant
perspective into overcoming resistance.
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